Researchers at the Conflict Intelligence Group (CIG) say they tracked phones set to Spanish to a Somali port and a Libyan transit town, linking them to supply routes for Sudan's Rapid Support Forces. Mobile-phone records and geolocation data analysed by the CIG map a network that suggests an organised flow of personnel and matériel across the Red Sea and through North Africa.

Signals trail a murky chain Researchers at the Conflict Intelligence Group (CIG) say mobile-phone records and geolocation data reveal a pattern tying devices with Spanish‑language settings to sites far from Colombia — including a port in Somalia and a town in south‑eastern Libya — locations the group links to supply lines feeding the RSF. CIG mapped a network of devices and stops that, taken together, suggest an organised flow of personnel and matériel across the Red Sea and through North Africa, and says those links coincide with routes and hubs identified in earlier open‑source investigations of arms and logistics flows to the RSF. Who the RSF are and why foreign fighters matter The Rapid Support Forces are a powerful Sudanese paramilitary whose role in recent conflicts has drawn international attention. Their leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, has wielded both political and military influence inside Sudan. If accurate, the CIG data suggests the arrival of foreign fighters from Latin America — combatants who are neither local militias nor regional proxies but hired personnel moving through global networks. Foreign mercenaries can change the dynamics of a fight: they may bring combat experience, specialised skills and a readiness to take risks local forces may avoid, while also complicating accountability when they move through covert logistics chains and middlemen. Maritime and overland routes under scrutiny The CIG flagged two notable locations where devices with Spanish‑language settings were found: - A port in Somalia that the group says has connections to the United Arab Emirates. - A town in south‑eastern Libya viewed as a logistical hub for shipments bound for the RSF. Those findings point to a network spanning the Red Sea and the central Mediterranean — corridors used by both commercial and illicit traders. The presence of these devices at transit nodes does not by itself prove direct orders or payments, but suggests a practical route from Latin America or intermediaries through African transit points into Sudan. The alleged role of the United Arab Emirates The CIG's report links some nodes in the chain to the United Arab Emirates. Investigators said they identified devices at a Somali port with ties to the Emirates and observed overlap between the movements of those devices and activity at the Libyan transhipment point. CIG frames the Emirati connection as facilitation rather than command. Accusations that outside states enable or facilitate supply lines are politically loaded. If pursued, they could prompt diplomatic scrutiny and raise questions about how regional and extra‑regional actors can influence a conflict without deploying formal military forces. Legal and diplomatic consequences The CIG says its chain of evidence could prompt legal and diplomatic inquiries if governments choose to investigate further; establishing direct responsibility for transfers or facilitation would require additional proof and official probes.

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The CIG said it identified devices with Spanish‑language settings at a Somali port linked to the UAE and at a town in south‑eastern Libya believed to be a logistical hub for weapons bound for the RSF, and added that proving state responsibility would require further official investigations.

This article was created with AI assistance.